Criminal Law and the Constitution: A Journey Through Landmark Judgments

K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1962)

The case of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra is one of the most significant criminal law cases in Indian legal history. Not only did it spark widespread public interest due to its dramatic facts and intense media coverage, but it also led to a major transformation in India’s criminal justice system. This case till date holds significance while defining distinction between Murder (Section 103) and Culpable Homicide not amounting Murder (Section 105).

FACTS

This case involves a love triangle and a loaded gun, where a commander in Indian Navy, K.M.Nanavati, come to know his wife’s, Sylvia Nanavati, extra marital affair with his friend, Prem Ahuja, after her confession to him. Following the revelation, he dropped his family, wife and three children, at a cinema hall. Returned to his ship, collected a loaded revolver under the pretext of personal security, and went to confront Ahuja. A little while later, Ahuja was found dead in his apartment with some bullet wounds and Nanavati surrendered to the police.

LEGAL ISSUES

1. The case questioned the credibility of the jury trails and whether the jurors got influenced by the media and public opinion?

2. Can in this case Nanavati use the benefit of the Exception 1 under Section 101, BNS (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) i.e., Grave and sudden provocation?

JUDGMENT

This case marked the end of the jury trials in criminal cases in India. Soon after the case, it was realized that the jury can be influenced and affected by the media and public opinion which might lead to a biased and irrational decisions by jurors. The case was extensively covered by media outlets and sensationalized in tabloids, making it one of the first instances of a media trial in India. The public sympathy toward Nanavati highlighted the tension between legal reasoning and public morality. By the amendment of 1959 to Code of Criminal Procedure, jury trials were abolished for criminal cases. Addressing the second issue in question, it was noticed that to apply the exception 1 of section 101 it was necessary that the act amounting to offence must be committed in the heat of the moment under the circumstances of grave and sudden provocation. Whereas in the present case, it is very clear by the facts stated that K.M.Nanavati took his time and firstly dropped off the family at the theatre. Later on, he went to issue his gun which clearly indicates that he had enough time to ‘cool down’. So the defence under the Exception 1 of Section 101 isn’t justifiable. Consequently, this case helped in establishing jurisprudence on how ‘cooling-off periods’ negate the benefit under the exception of grave and sudden provocation. It reaffirmed that intent and premeditation override emotional justifications if time and planning are involved.

BACHAN SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB, 1980

The decision in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab is among the most landmark decisions ever rendered by Indian criminal jurisprudence, specifically with regard to the constitutionality and application of capital punishment. The case became pivotal in influencing the doctrine of sentencing in India and gave birth to the "rarest of rare" doctrine for the imposition of the death penalty.

FACTS

Bachan Singh was previously convicted for killing his wife and was given a life sentence. Upon release, he was staying with his cousin. In his temporary stay, he committed another triple murder—murdering his cousin, the wife of his cousin, and their son. He also inflicted grievous injuries on another relative. The reason seemed to be associated with domestic altercations, and the extent of the crime was barbaric. Bachan Singh was sentenced to death under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Sessions Court after finding him guilty. The death sentence was upheld by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The appeal in the Supreme Court questioned not just the sentence but even if the death penalty itself was constitutional.

LEGAL ISSUES

1. Is Section 302 of the IPC, prescribing the death penalty, constitutionally valid, especially in the light of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution?

2. Whether the discretion left to the judges by Section 354(3) CrPC (to pass a death sentence only in the case of special reasons) is arbitrary or nebulous?

3. When is it legally justified to sentence a person to death rather than life imprisonment?

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court, in a 4:1 majority judgment, upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty as under Section302 IPC. The Court ruled that the provision was not violative of Articles 14, 19, or 21 of the Constitution. The Court underscored that while capital punishment continues to be permissible, its imposition must be exceptional, adequately justified, and limited only to the most serious of crimes. This gave rise to the formulation of the famous "rarest of rare" doctrine. The Court said that life imprisonment must be the norm, and death penalty can be inflicted only when the other option is patently excluded. The Court also made it clear that Section354(3) of CrPC, which requires that "special reasons" be recorded to impose a death sentence, is a protection which provides that the death sentence is not arbitrarily imposed but, on the contrary, serves to prevent judicial arbitrariness.

Justice P.N. Bhagwati, dissenting, contended that the death penalty is unconstitutional, discriminatory in application, and arbitrary in its application, especially against the poor and disadvantaged. This case holds tremendous value in Indian criminal law and remains a landmark precedent for death penalty convictions. It established a systematic method to decide whether a convict warrants the death penalty by taking into account not only the case of the crime, but also the offender's character, and whether or not there exists any hope of reform.

It was a move towards reformative justice—focusing more on rehabilitation rather than retribution, and engendered an effective judicial balance against the abuse of capital punishment. This decision also emphasized proportionality in sentences. It de- encouraged mechanical sentencing to death and required careful evaluation of mitigating and aggravating factors in individual cases.

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)

Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, enacted during the colonial period in 1861, made "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" a criminal offense. Though its wording was ambiguous, it had been used to harass the LGBTQIA+ community for years, resulting in social stigma harassment by the police, and exclusion from institutions. In 2001, the Naz Foundation, an NGO dealing with HIV/AIDS and LGBTQ+ health, instituted a public interest litigation in the Delhi High Court on the grounds that Section 377 infringed fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009) concurred and read down Section 377 to decriminalize consensual same-sex behaviour between adults. Yet this progressive judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2013), which ruled that LGBTQ individuals represented a "minuscule minority" and Section 377 was constitutionally legitimate. This overturning generated universal outrage, grief, and international condemnation. It was in these wakeful hours that five petitioners — classical dancer Navtej Singh Johar among them — went to the Supreme Court once again to reassert their rights.

FACTS

Petitioners were artists, activists, and professionals — all who self-identify as queer. Their argument was basic, yet deep: freedom to live, and love as one chooses, without the prospect of being criminalized for simply being themselves. They contended that Section 377 contravened their basic rights to equality, dignity, privacy, and expression — echoing the dissent against the Koushal judgment and endeavouring to revive the spirit of the Naz Foundation judgment.

LEGAL ISSUES

1. Does Section 377 infringe Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution?

2. Can privacy and dignity of a person cover one's sexual orientation as well?

3. Must constitutional morality take precedence over public or religious morality?

4. Can a democratic society still criminalize consensual sex between consenting adults on the basis of old colonial morality?

JUDGMENT

By a landmark 5-0 verdict, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court decriminalized same-sex relations between consenting adults, ruling that:

• Section 377 to the extent that it criminalized consensual sexual acts between adults was unconstitutional.

• Sexual orientation is a natural and inherent characteristic of identity.

• Forbidding LGBTQ individuals from the right to love and intimacy infringes on their right to life with dignity under Article 21.

• Public morality cannot override constitutional morality.

• All persons, regardless of their orientation, are entitled to complete citizenship and equal rights.

Justice D.Y. Chandrachud aptly remarked that Section 377 turned into a tool for harassment and humiliation, especially by law enforcement officials. Justice Indu Malhotra observed with great grace and compassion: "History owes an apology to the members of the LGBT community."

HUMAN DIGNITY AS THE JUDGMENT'S CORE

Central to the judgment was the confirmation of human dignity as a key constitutional value. The court accepted that laws had to be in the spirit of inclusivity rather than oppression. According to legal analyst Michele Finck in her piece on gay rights adjudication, dignity then is the language through which law imports and renders changing social mores. She writes:

"Dignity encapsulates what Martha Nussbaum wrote about as the shift from 'disgust' to 'humanity'. Homosexuals are now seen as 'full humans' who possess equal rights, and dignity acts as the lexicon that converts such socio-cultural transformation into legal transformation."

The Court reflected this philosophy — that queer people are not merely objects of pity or protection, but bearers of rights — equal in humanity and deserving of self-expression, love, and respect.

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018)

The Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India was a landmark moment for gender equality and constitutional morality in striking down Section 497 IPC which criminalized adultery. In addition to decriminalizing a provision of colonial origin, the judgment also analyzed the intersection of gender justice, personal autonomy, and criminal law's role in governing personal relationships.

FACTS

Joseph Shine, a non-resident Keralite, had instituted a Public Interest Litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the constitutional validity of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 198(2) of the CrPC (which regulated who could complain in adultery cases). Section 497 made adultery a criminal offense when a man had sex with a married woman without the connivance or consent of her husband. The woman was exempted from prosecution. The law considered the husband to be the aggrieved party, effectively reducing the wife to a passive object, devoid of agency. The petitioner contended that the provision was arbitrary, discriminatory, and interfered with Articles 14 (equality), 15 (anti-discrimination), and 21 (right to life and liberty).

LEGAL ISSUES

1. Is Section 497 IPC violative of Article 14 as it discriminates against men and women in a different manner?

2. Is women's exemption from punishment under Section 497 violative of Article 15(1) which prohibits discrimination based on sex?

3. Does criminalizing adultery under Section 497 violate the personal liberty and dignity guaranteed under Article 21?

4. Can laws founded on archaic social concepts of marriage and morality survive constitutional challenge?

JUDGMENT

A five-judge Constitution Bench, headed by then CJI Dipak Misra, and comprising Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra, held Section 497 IPC and Section 198(2) CrPC as unconstitutional by a unanimous verdict.

The Court held that Section 497 was patently arbitrary inasmuch as it discriminated between men and women. It gave a right to prosecute to men while withholding the same from women. Further, women could not be prosecuted under this law, not even as abettors, indicating they were lacking in agency or intention — a patriarchal perspective.

The immunity extended to women was not a "protective" provision but a discriminatory shield, perpetuating stereotypes of women as inferior or incapable of agency.

The Court stressed that the right to privacy, dignity, and sexual autonomy are integral to Article 21. Criminalizing consensual sexual acts between adults, even if immoral in the eyes of society, was an unjust encroachment on personal liberty.

The Court emphasized that a woman is not a chattel or property of her husband, and her decisions — including those in her personal relationships — cannot be dictated by criminal law.

Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, in his concurring judgment, observed that constitutional morality should override patriarchal social morality. He pointed out that Section 497 was rooted in outdated ideas of male superiority and female submissiveness that have no role to play in a progressive constitutional order.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

The Shreya Singhal ruling is a milestone in Indian constitutional law that maintained freedom of speech and expression online. The Supreme Court, in this instance, declared Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 to be unconstitutional, thereby establishing a precedent for safeguarding online speech against vague and arbitrary penal clauses.

FACTS

The case arose out of the arrest of two women in Maharashtra under Section 66A of the IT Act, for posting and liking a comment on Facebook criticizing the shutdown of Mumbai upon the death of a political leader. Their arrest led to outrage across the country and raised serious questions about the ambit and misuse of Section 66A, which criminalized sending 'offensive' messages over communication services.

Petitioner Shreya Singhal, who is a student of law, moved a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against the validity of Section 66A, along with Section 69A and the Intermediary Guidelines (Rules), 2011, on the premise that they infringed the right to free speech and expression.

LEGAL ISSUES

1. Whether Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 is violative of Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression)?

2. Whether the restrictions imposed by the section can be justified under Article 19(2) (reasonable restrictions?)?

3. Whether the provision is vague, overbroad, and prone to arbitrary enforcement?

4. Whether Sections 69A and the Intermediary Guidelines contravene the Constitution?

JUDGMENT

The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a milestone judgment, declared Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 to be unconstitutional in its entirety on the grounds that it was violative of Article 19(1)(a) and could not be saved under the reasonable restrictions allowed by Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that the offending provision did not define a proximate nexus between the expression sought to be criminalized and the reasons listed in Article 19(2), including public order, defamation, or inciting an offence. The terminology of Section 66A was deemed imprecise, vague, and overly broad with terms like 'grossly offensive', 'annoying', or 'menacing in character' devoid of legislative specificity and thus inviting arbitrary enforcement by law enforcement authorities.

In a comprehensive comparative examination, the Court drew on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the doctrine of vagueness, observing that any penal legislation has to define offences in a clear manner adequate to allow persons to control their behaviour in accordance. Section 66A fell short of this standard, thereby having a chilling effect on speech that is constitutionally guaranteed.

The Court went on to highlight that subjective understanding of offensiveness or annoyance cannot form the ground for criminal sanction, particularly in a constitutional democracy that seeks to protect pluralism of ideas. Section 66A was therefore held to be violative of the freedom of speech and expression and struck down. As for Section 69A of the IT Act and the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, the Court upheld their constitutional validity. However, it clarified that the procedural safeguards enshrined in the rules—such as reasons for blocking orders, opportunity for hearing, and review mechanisms—must be strictly adhered to by authorities. Unlike Section 66A, Section 69A was found to be narrowly tailored, subject to adequate procedural checks, and therefore within the permissible limits of Article 19(2).

This case set crucial jurisprudence on digital rights, particularly within the framework of cyber law and criminal law. In striking down Section 66A, the Supreme Court: Saved internet freedom and upheld the value of dissent in a democracy. Set a high benchmark for the constitutionality of speech-related legislation, ensuring that they should not be vague or arbitrary. Protected the right to access, publish, and distribute information online as a fundamental element of free expression.

About the Author- Aayushi Kharb is a First Year Law student at Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.